Buckley v. Valeo


424 U.S. 1 (1976)

U.S. Supreme Court
Decided January 30, 1976


These appeals present constitutional challenges to the key provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (Act), and related provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, all as amended in 1974.
 The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the legislation in large part against various constitutional challenges, viewed it as “by far the most comprehensive reform legislation [ever] passed by Congress concerning the election of the President, Vice-President, and members of Congress.” The statutes at issue summarized in broad terms, contain the following provisions: (a) individual political contributions are limited to $1,000 to any single candidate per election, with an overall annual limitation of $25,000 by any contributor; independent expenditures by individuals and groups “relative to a clearly identified candidate” are limited to $1,000 a year; campaign spending by candidates for various federal offices and spending for national conventions by political parties are subject to prescribed limits; (b) contributions and expenditures above certain threshold levels must be reported and publicly disclosed; (c) a system for public funding of Presidential campaign activities is established by Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code; and (d) a Federal Election Commission is established to administer and enforce the legislation.
 This suit was originally filed by appellants in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs included a candidate for the Presidency of the United States, a United States Senator who is a candidate for re-election, a potential contributor, the Committee for a Constitutional Presidency – McCarthy ’76, the Conservative Party of the State of New York, the Mississippi Republican Party, the Libertarian Party, the New York Civil Liberties Union, Inc., the American Conservative Union, the Conservative Victory Fund, and Human Events, Inc. The defendants included the Secretary of the United States Senate and the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives, both in their official capacities and as ex officio members of the Federal Election Commission. The Commission itself was named as a defendant. Also named were the Attorney General of the United States and the Comptroller General of the United States….
  In this Court, appellants argue that the Court of Appeals failed to give this legislation the critical scrutiny demanded under accepted First Amendment and equal protection principles. In appellants’ view, limiting the use of money for political purposes constitutes a restriction on communication violative of the First Amendment, since virtually all meaningful political communications in the modern setting involve the expenditure of money. Further, they argue that the reporting and disclosure provisions of the Act unconstitutionally impinge on their right to freedom of association….
 The intricate statutory scheme adopted by Congress to regulate federal election campaigns includes restrictions  on political contributions and expenditures that apply broadly to all phases of and all participants in the election process. The major contribution and expenditure limitations in the Act prohibit individuals from contributing more than $25,000 in a single year or more than $1,000 to any single candidate for an election campaign and from spending more than $1,000 a year “relative to a clearly identified candidate.” Other provisions restrict a candidate’s use of personal and family resources in his campaign and limit the overall amount that can be spent by a candidate in campaigning for federal office.
 The constitutional power of Congress to regulate federal elections is well established and is not questioned by any of the parties in this case. Thus, the critical constitutional questions presented here go not to the basic power of Congress to legislate in this area, but to whether the specific legislation that Congress has enacted interferes with First Amendment freedoms or invidiously discriminates against nonincumbent candidates and minor parties in contravention of the Fifth Amendment.
 A. General Principles
 The Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities. Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order “to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.” Although First Amendment protections are not confined to “the exposition of ideas,” “there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs, . . . of course includ[ing] discussions of candidates . . . .” This no more than reflects our “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”  In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential, for the identities of those who are elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a nation.
 The First Amendment protects political association as well as political expression. The constitutional right of association explicated in NAACP v. Alabama (1958), stemmed from the Court’s recognition that “[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association.” Subsequent decisions have made clear that the First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee “`freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas,'” a freedom that encompasses “`[t]he right to associate with the political party of one’s choice.'”
 It is with these principles in mind that we consider the primary contentions of the parties with respect to the Act’s limitations upon the giving and spending of money in political campaigns. Those conflicting contentions could not more sharply define the basic issues before us. Appellees contend that what the Act regulates is conduct, and that its effect on speech and association is incidental at most. Appellants respond that contributions and expenditures are at the very core of political speech, and that the Act’s limitations thus constitute restraints on First Amendment liberty that are both gross and direct.
 In upholding the constitutional validity of the Act’s contribution and expenditure provisions on the ground that those provisions should be viewed as regulating conduct, not speech, the Court of Appeals relied upon United States v. O’Brien (1968). The O’Brien case involved a defendant’s claim that the First Amendment prohibited his prosecution for burning his draft card because his act was “`symbolic speech'” engaged in as a “`demonstration against the war and against the draft.'”  On the assumption that “the alleged communicative element in O’Brien’s conduct [was] sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment,” the Court sustained the conviction because it found “a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the non-speech element” that was “unrelated to the suppression of free expression” and that had an “incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms . . . no greater than [was] essential to the furtherance of that interest.”
 We cannot share the view that the present Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations are comparable to the restrictions on conduct upheld in O’Brien. The expenditure of money simply cannot be equated with such conduct as destruction of a draft card. Some forms of communication made possible by the giving and spending of money involve speech alone, some involve conduct primarily, and some involve a combination of the two. Yet this Court has never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a non speech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment.
 Even if the categorization of the expenditure of money as conduct were accepted, the limitations challenged here would not meet the O’Brien test because the governmental interests advanced in support of the Act involve “suppressing communication.” The interests served by the Act include restricting the voices of people and interest groups who have money to spend and reducing the overall scope of federal election campaigns. Although the Act does not focus on the ideas expressed by persons or groups subject to its regulations, it is aimed in part at equalizing the relative ability of all voters to affect electoral outcomes by placing a ceiling on expenditures for political expression by citizens and groups. Unlike O’Brien, where the Selective Service System’s administrative interest in the preservation of draft cards was wholly unrelated to their use as a means of communication, it is beyond dispute that the interest in regulating the alleged “conduct” of giving or spending money “arises in some measure because the communication allegedly integral to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful….”
 A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money. The distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails printing, paper, and circulation costs. Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hiring a hall and publicizing the event. The electorate’s increasing dependence on television, radio, and other mass media for news and information has made these expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political speech.
 The expenditure limitations contained in the Act represent substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech. The $1,000 ceiling on spending “relative to a clearly identified candidate,” would appear to exclude all citizens and groups except candidates, political parties, and the institutional press from any significant use of the most  effective modes of communication. Although the Act’s limitations on expenditures by campaign organizations and political parties provide substantially greater room for discussion and debate, they would have required restrictions in the scope of a number of past congressional and Presidential campaigns and would operate to constrain campaigning by candidates who raise sums in excess of the spending ceiling….
  Given the important role of contributions in financing political campaigns, contribution restrictions could have a severe impact on political dialogue if the limitations prevented candidates and political committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy…. 
  In sum, ….the Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations both implicate fundamental First Amendment interests….